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Net-worth covenants, as introduced by Black and Cox (1976), provide the firm’s 
bondholders with the right to force reorganization or liquidation if the value of the 
firm falls below a certain threshold. In the event of default, however, many 
bankruptcy codes stipulate an automatic stay of assets that prevent bondholders from 
triggering liquidation and thus impact many positive net-worth covenants.  
To consider this impact on a corporation’s capital structure we develop a 
general model of liquidation driven by a liquidation trigger. This trigger accumulates 
with time and severity of distress. In addition, current distress periods may have 
greater weight than old ones. The tractability of the approach stems from its ability to 
allow parameters appropriate for different legal rules and types of bondholder safety 
covenants. 
The proposed model includes several well-known models, like Merton, Black-
Cox and others. We show how to valuate various types of corporate securities by 
using this model. Numerical results and sensitivity analysis are presented for selected 











The modeling of default is crucial in determining the value of corporate securities. 
The classic structural approach, based on Black and Scholes (1973) and pioneered by 
Merton (1974), assumes that default can only occur in the event that the total value of 
the firm at maturity is less than the contractual payment due on the debt.  To cope 
with the possibility of early default prior to bond maturity, Black-Cox (1976, hereafter 
BC) developed a “first passage” model, which assumes that the time of default is the 
first instance that the market value of the assets of the issuer has fallen below a 
specified distress threshold that precipitates immediate liquidation of the firm’s assets. 
This distress threshold marks the trigger for the liquidation of firm’s assets in 
subsequent structural models as well [see Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995), Leland (1994), Ericsson and Reneby (1998) and others]. 
As noted by Leland (1994) and Ericsson and Reneby (1998), there are several 
ways to determine and justify a distress threshold. A legal interpretation is based on 
the practice in many countries to determine the financial distress threshold in 
corporate law. The minimum value of the firm’s assets signaling legal financial 
distress is usually related to the total nominal value of outstanding debt. An economic 
approach views the distress threshold as the level of asset value necessary for the firm 
to retain sufficient credibility to continue operations.  A contractual interpretation for 
the existence of the distress threshold is based on positive net worth covenants that 
enable bondholderss to force reorganization or liquidation in the event the value of the 
firm falls below a pre-determined threshold.    4
In practice the onset of financial distress does not necessarily lead to 
immediate liquidation of the firm’s assets by its debtholders. Often, for political and 
social considerations, bankruptcy laws favor firm continuation and creditors cannot 
immediately liquidate the firm.
1 Legal bankruptcy protection, like Chapter 11 of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, enables a firm experiencing financial distress to renegotiate its 
outstanding debt. As noted by Bebchuk and Chang (1992) and Bebchuk (1997, 2002), 
once an insolvent company files for reorganization under Chapter 11, an “automatic 
stay” prevents debtholders from seizing assets until a reorganization plan is adopted. 
If the parties fail to agree on a reorganization plan, the supervising court would 
eventually convert the bankruptcy proceedings to a Chapter 7 liquidation of the firm’s 
assets. While the supervising court has not decided on liquidation procedure the 
debtholders cannot obtain any value from the company before they agree with the 
equityholders on the division of the firm’s assets. 
Empirical studies have found that the average time period between the 
indication of financial distress and its resolution ranges between two to three years for 
firms that renegotiate their claim under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
2  
Moreover, empirical studies show that most firms emerge from Chapter 11 and only 
few are actually liquidated.
3  Empirical studies focusing on the distinction between 
the bankruptcy event and the division of the firm’s assets between the different     
stakeholders point out that liquidation models based on “first passage”, as introduced 
first by BC (1976), are invalid, since reaching the threshold does not automatically 
trigger either liquidation or reorganization of the firm’s assets.  
                                                 
1 See White (1994). 
2 See Frank and Torous (1989), Betker (1995), Gilson (1997) and Helwege (1999). 
3 According to Weiss (1990) and Gilson, John and Lang (1990), only 5% of the firms were liquidated 
under Chapter 7 after filing for Chapter 11 protection, while according to Morse and Show (1988) 15% 
- 25% of these firms are liquidated.     5
To address the discrepancy between bankruptcy and the liquidation of the 
firm’s assets recent work on capital structure and securities valuation suggests that 
liquidation occurs only if the value of the firm’s assets has reached the distress 
threshold and remains below this threshold for a prolonged period of time. Fan and 
Sundaresan (2000) suggest that when the firm is in default, borrowers stop making the 
contractual coupon and start servicing the debt strategically until the firm’s asset 
value returns to a level above the distress threshold. 
In this spirit, a liquidation model developed by François and Morellec (2002, 
hereafter FM), assumes that the firm issues perpetual debt with contractual coupon 
payments, and liquidation occurs when the value of its assets dips below the distress 
threshold and remains below that level for an interval exceeding a pre-determined 
‘grace’ period. If the firm’s asset value rebounds and rises above the distress threshold 
before the pre-determined grace period has elapsed, the procedure is discontinued and 
the invisible “distress clock” is reset to zero.  According to this approach, while debt 
is strategically serviced automatically after the value of the firm crosses the distress 
threshold, liquidation is declared only after the predetermined grace period has run its 
course.  
Moraux (2002), points out that according to this liquidation model, each time 
firm value falls below the threshold level an additional grace period is granted without 
reference to previous instances of insolvency. Asset value could remain below the 
threshold level for the majority of the duration of debt without the firm being 
liquidated. To overcome this deficiency, Moraux (2002) assumes that the firm issues 
zero-coupon debt, and proposes that liquidation is triggered when the total time that 
the firm’s asset value spends under the distress threshold  (“excursion time”) exceeds 
a pre-determined grace period. Consequently, the previous “distress clock” is not reset 
to zero when the value of the firm’s assets rebounds above the threshold. In this   6
manner, the liquidation model becomes highly path-dependent, since it accumulates 
the entire history of a firm’s financial distress. However, by simply accumulating 
excursion time this model gives a company’s history of financial distress an equal 
weight in triggering liquidation.  
This model may distort the empirical nature of the liquidation process, which 
while affected by the ‘big picture’, is not necessary triggered by it. This path-
dependent liquidation process might have “too strong a memory”.  Under this model, 
a firm may be liquidated even if the value of the firm’s assets has recently spent only 
a very short period of time under the distress threshold (since years ago it had spent an 
extensive period below the threshold and as a result the total time has reached the 
predetermined graced period).  
A second drawback of the above two liquidation models (FM and Moraux) 
results from not considering the impact of distress severity on the decision to liquidate 
firm’s assets.  These two models do not differentiate between cases in which firm 
value is below but close to the distress threshold and cases firm value falls far below 
the threshold level. The decision to liquidate is often a function of degree as well as 
time. 
To overcome the drawbacks of these two methods and to describe liquidation 
in a more realistic and flexible manner, we develop a model in which the impact of 
prior transgressions on the liquidation trigger is a function of both the severity of the 
current distress period and the distance of past events from it. According to our 
model, liquidation is triggered when the total weighted time that firm value has spent 
under the distress threshold exceeds the pre-determined grace period. By applying this 
process one can increase the weight of recent and/or severe distress periods over early 
and/or mild distress periods on the decision to liquidate the firm’s assets. This method   7
allows the invisible “distress clock to move in syncopated rhythm, and debtholders 
can claim value when the pre-determined grace period is violated. 
Our general model for liquidation can be adapted to a wide array of legal 
regimes and contractual arrangements. Each legal and economic environment can be 
efficiently translated into an appropriate liquidation procedure. At one extreme, we 
can exclude or significantly reduce the impact of distress episodes in the distant past 
on the liquidation trigger. At the other extreme, we can weigh each distress 
observation equally. Our model, therefore, is a general model incorporating both FM 
(2002) and Moraux (2002).  
The nature of the different liquidation procedures has important ex-ante 
consequences, since participants in the market agree to finance the company on terms 
that reflect the possible ex-post outcomes, which may include reorganization or 
liquidation of a firm’s assets. By employing our approach one can directly value 
different types of corporate securities and analyze complex capital structure scenarios 
for various liquidation procedures. We provide numerical examples to investigate how 
the length of the grace period, liquidation decay factors, distress severity, leverage 
ratios and the firm’s asset volatility affect both asset prices and credit spreads. 
The model presented in this paper assumes a simple capital structure with one 
type of zero-coupon debt. However, it can be easily extended to a case in which the 
firm has issued both senior and junior debt, convertible bonds or warrants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 specifies the 
assumptions, and the valuation models for equity and debt are derived. Section 3 
specifically outlines the pricing of zero-coupon bonds under our model. Section 4 is 
devoted to explaining existing liquidation models and to highlighting the advantage of 
our model over these models. In section 5, we numerically analyze the main 
implications of the models for asset pricing. Conclusions are presented in section 6.   8





2. A Liquidation Model with Adjustable Memory 
 
In this section we construct a general and adaptive liquidation model with adjustable 
memory to estimate the value of various corporate securities. According to our model, 
liquidation is triggered when the exponentially weighted cumulative time that firm 
value has spends under the distress threshold exceeds a fixed exogenous amount of 
time. Using our model, it is possible to increase the impact of late and/or severe 
distress periods over early and/or mild distress periods on the decision to liquidate. 
We rely on standard structural approach assumptions: assets are continuously traded 
in an arbitrage-free and complete market with riskless borrowing or lending at a 
constant rate r . The instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return of the firm, 
σ , is constant; the value of the firm’s assets,  t V , is independent of the capital 
structure of the firm, and is well described under the risk neutral measure Q, by the 
following stochastic differential equation: 
 
t t t t dW V dt V r dV σ δ + − = ) (            (1) 
 
where W is a standard Brownian motion and δ is the firm’s payout ratio.    
We suppose that the firm has outstanding only equity and a single bond issue 
with a promised final payment of P . The firm goes bankrupt in one of two ways:   9
either if the value of the firm’s assets falls below a time dependent threshold level, 
denoted by  t K , at any time prior to debt maturity, or if the value of the assets is less 
than some constant F at debt maturity.
4  
According to the BC (1976) model, the default event allows the creditor to 
force immediate liquidation through its safety covenants. In our model, as in FM 
(2002) and Moraux (2002) models, default and liquidation are distinct events. We 
assume that liquidation is declared when the total weighted excursion time (hereafter 
“cumulative distress time”, or CDT), exceeds a pre-determined grace period, denoted 
by d . In order to determine the CDT we define the time dependent threshold level  t K  
according to BC (1976): 
 
1 0   :    where
) ( ≤ ≤ =
− − λ λ
t T r
t Fe K                                                                                (2) 
 
In this exponential form the threshold level is a constant fraction of the promised final 








t g is the last time before t that firm value crossed threshold  s K . The state 
variable for the liquidation trigger (the CDT) is defined by 
K
t I , which is equal to the 
exponentially weighted excursion time at date t, and defined: 
                                                 
4 Usually this parameter is set to equal the principal P  of debt as in Merton (1974) and in subsequent 
models. However, if liquidation costs are incurred at maturity, as in Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), 
this may not accurately reflect the value of debt. 
   10
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where  β  is the decay factor for past distress periods and γ  is the decay factor of the 
last distress period. As β and γ  increase, the impact of past distress periods become 
decreasingly meaningful to the decision to liquidate the firm. The 
function ) ( t V f defines the impact of the severity of the distress event on the 
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where  0 ≥ α . 
Accordingly, the decision to liquidate a firm’s assets does not depend solely 
on the duration of the distress periods or its continuity, as described in Moraux (2002) 
and FM (2002) respectively, but also on the distance of past distress periods from the 
present and on the severity of distress i.e. the degree to which firm value falls below 
the threshold. Liquidation occurs the first time that the CDT extends beyond d . The 
liquidation time is denoted by 
K θ , and it is defined mathematically by: 
 
{ } t t
K
t
K K V d I t ≤ ≥ > =   ,     0   inf θ                           (6) 
 
In the special case where α=0, the severity of the distress period has no impact on the 
liquidation procedure and the CDT can be calculated by the expression:   11
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where  {} B S K V ≤ 1  is the characteristic function that receives the value of one if firm value 
is below the distress threshold level, and zero otherwise. 
In our setup, shareholders hold a corporate security with payoffs equivalent to 
a complex Parisian call option on the value of the firm’s assets. The shareholders have 
a residual claim on the cash flows generated by the firm’s assets unless the weighted 
excursion time under the distress threshold has reached the pre-determined grace 
period,d . The bondholders hold a corporate security with payoffs equivalent to a 
complex Parisian option with rebate. The following examples are of special interest 
since they pertain to previous contributions of the literature. In all of these examples 
α=0. 
 
Example 1. When  +∞ →   β  and  0 = γ , liquidation procedure occurs at the first point 
in time that the firm value process has spent consecutively more than the pre- 
specified grace period below the threshold  t K . Thus, when  +∞ →   β  and  0 = γ , we 
get the François and Morellec (2002) liquidation procedure.  
 
In this example the CDT is accumulated only during the current distress 
period, where past distress periods do not influence the liquidation trigger. At the one 
extreme, when  0 = d , the FM model gets, as a special case, the standard modeling of 
default and liquidation [see Leland (1994)]. At the other extreme, when  ) ( t T d − > , 
i.e. the grace period is longer than the maturity of debt, default never leads to   12
liquidation before debt maturity and the FM (2002) model takes on, as a special case, 
the standard model for default and reorganization [see Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1996) or Fan and Sundaresan (2000)]. 
 
Example 2. When  0  = β  and  0 = γ , liquidation occurs the first time the firm value 
spends a total time greater than the pre specified grace period below  t K . Thus, when 
0  = β  and  0 = γ , we have the Moraux (2002) liquidation procedure.  
 
Under this parameterization, each distress period is weighted equally and each period 
has the same influence on 
K
t I . At the one extreme, when  0 = d , no extra survival 
time below the distress threshold is allowed, default leads to immediate liquidation of 
the firm’s assets and we get, as a special case, the BC (1976) liquidation model. At the 
other extreme, when  ) ( t T d − ≥ , liquidation can occur only at debt maturity, and the 
model collapses to the basic structural approach introduced by Merton (1974).  
In the next section a valuation model for equity and debt is derived under 
various liquidation procedures. The procedure by which the firm’s value is divided 
among the different claimants as a result of a financial distress is a crucial issue in the 
pricing of the various contingent claims. FM (2002), following Sundaresan and Fan 
(2000), assume that during default periods a sharing of cash flow rule results from a 
bargaining game among the claimants. In this form, reorganization of the firm’s assets 
becomes a necessary precondition for subsequent liquidation, which is a costly 
procedure. This framework is somehow inconsistent with the actual nature of the 
bankruptcy procedure, as described by Bebchuk (1997), which prevents debtholders 
from extracting any value before they agree with the equityholders on the division of 
the firm’s assets. Therefore, we assume in our framework that debtholders can extract   13
value only after the value of the firm assets has exhausted the predetermined grace 
period under the distress threshold. This approach is consistent with BC (1976) that 
refers to the threshold level as the point at which debtholders can takeover the firm’s 
assets 
3. The Valuation of Defaultable Bonds 
 
In this section we evaluate the various corporate securities by considering the simple 
case of a firm with risky assets  t V , which is financed by equity,  t S , and one debt 
obligation, maturing at time T , with par value P , and market value  t B . The bond 
contract conveys to debtholders, under a protective covenant, the right to force 
liquidation at any time  T] [0,   ∈ t , if asset value equals or is lower than an exogenous 
threshold level  t K . However, the debtholders succeed to force liquidation only when 
the liquidation trigger, 
K
t I , exceeds the predetermined grace period, d . At 
liquidation, debtholders would receive  K V
θ  at time
K θ ; and equityholders would 
receive nothing. At debt maturity, T , assuming no early liquidation has been 
declared, equityholders would receive the maximum between zero and the difference 
between the firm assets value,  T V , and the promised face value, P . Equityholder 
rights are isomorphic to the payoff function of a European complex Parisian option, 
using the indicator function  {} T
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The value of the equityholders claim at any time prior to debt maturity  ] , 0 [ T t ∈ , 
provided that default has not occurred by time t, is expressed by:  
 
{} ] 1 ) [( ) , , , (
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where ] [⋅ t E denotes the conditional expectation under a risk neutral measure Q, given 
available information at time t.
5 
The value of the zero-coupon bond is decomposed to two sources of value: 
firstly, its value at maturity, assuming the firm is not prematurely liquidated, and 
secondly, its value if the firm is liquidated before debt maturity, T , since the pre- 
determined grace period d was violated by the weighted excursion distress time. As 
noted by BC (1976), although those two components are mutually exclusive, they are 
both possible outcomes.  Accordingly each contributes to the present value of both 
equity and debt.
6  The price of a zero coupon bond, B , with maturity  t T > , under the 
risk neutral probability measure, is given by: 
 
{} {}
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Roughly speaking, the payoff at time  T d ∧ θ is given according to the no liquidation 
scenario (the left expression at the right hand side of the equation), in which 
debtholders receive the minimum between the value of the firm’s assets and the par 
value of debt, or alternatively, should early liquidation take place (the right expression 
                                                 
5 We use the risk neutral valuation assuming the market is perfect. 
6 Black and Cox (1976) decompose firm value into two additional components: the upper boundary of 
the security value if the firm is reorganized and the value of the payouts it will potentially receive.     15
at the right hand side of the equation), debtholders receive the value of the firm’s 
assets at that time. 
The next step in evaluating the firm’s capital structure is to calculate the zero-
coupon yield spread. Practitioners typically quote corporate bond prices in terms of 
the spread of their yield-to-maturity over the riskless interest rate. The firm credit 
spread at time t, denoted by  t sp is calculated as: 
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Given the above assumptions, we can derive the governing partial differential 
equations and boundary conditions that should be solved to value the firm’s stocks 
and bonds as a function of the three state variables  I t V   ,   , .  
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The boundary conditions are as follows: 
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The boundary conditions are as follows: 
 




T T < ≤ =   0 :                ) , (   min ) , , , (                                             (16) 
 
             ) , , , ( t t V T d t V B =                                                                                             (17) 
 
Bergman (1985) has developed a general procedure for pricing path-dependent 
contingent claims and applied the procedure to the case of the averaging claims. A 
new term that is proportional to the rate of change of the average is introduced to the 
Black-Scholes equation. Haber, Schönbucher and Wilmott (1999) have used this 
extension for the pricing of Parisian options, where a new state variable 
K
t I gives rise 
to a modified form of the Black-Scholes equation. In a standard Parisian option, the 
clock variable 
B K
t I is reset to zero once the price falls below  t K , where in the Parisian 
contract the knocked-out feature is activated only if the cumulative time spent below 
t K  exceeds some prescribed value. In our formulation, these two contracts constitute 
private cases of the more general specification of the virtual distress clock. We let the 
speed at which 
K
t I accumulates be dependent on the distance between the distress 
threshold and firm value, thus large deviations below the threshold are heavily weight. 
Countdown speed is also dependent on the distance of previous distress periods from 
current time, giving greater weight to recent events.  





4. The Limitation of Past Liquidation Models Based on the Excursion 
Time 
 
In this section we describe the two existing liquidation models that are based on 
excursion time as developed by FM (2002) and Moraux (2002). By using two 
numerical examples we illustrate the anomalous behavior stemming from each of 
them, and demonstrate how, through rational determination of the parameters, our 
general liquidation model can prevent such anomalies.   
In both examples, we consider a leveraged firm that issues only one stock and 
one zero-coupon bond maturing in 10 years. The debtholders are protected by a safety 
covenant that allows them to declare bankruptcy when the value of the firm’s assets is 
less than the distress threshold  t K . For each of the liquidation models, the distress 
period before liquidation lasts at most one year, so  1 = d . However, the state variable 
that triggers liquidation, 
K
t I , is treated differently in each model. According, to 
Moraux’s (2002) total cumulative excursion method, liquidation occurs when the 
value of the firm’s assets accumulates more than one year under the threshold level, 
and thus in our setting equation (7) is parameterized as follow:  0 = = = γ β α . 
According to FM’s (2002) consecutive excursion method, liquidation occurs when the 
value of the firm’s exceeds a consecutive one-year period under the distress threshold, 
and thus:      and    0 ∞ → = = β γ α . To illustrate our adjustable liquidation model we   18
have chosen a third set of parameters:  0.25   and    0, = = = β γ α . This parameterization 
constitutes a special case of our weighted cumulative excursion method. 
In the first example, depicted in figure 1, the value of the firm’s assets 
between the middle of the second year and the beginning of the seventh year has 
accumulated three years under the distress threshold. Figure 2 shows the value of the 
state variable that triggers liquidation according to each method. After 3.5 years, the 
cumulative distress period is greater than a year and liquidation is triggered according 
to the total cumulative excursion model. The weighted cumulative excursion method 
reduces the impact of previous distress periods and liquidation is postponed by four 
months, since the excursion periods are not consecutive. In the consecutive excursion 
method  the bankruptcy occurs no less than seven times, however, liquidation is 
avoided since none of these comprise a consecutive twelve-month period. The safety 
covenant is not respected despite the fact that the firm was in dire financial straits for 
a prolonged period of time. 
In the second example, as described in figures 3 and 4, the value of the firm’s 
assets crosses the distress threshold at the end of the third year for the first time and 
stays there for a consecutive time of ten months until firm value rebounds above the 
threshold. Liquidation procedures are not triggered under any of the three models 
since the liquidation state variable 
K
t I is less than one (10/12). In the middle of the 
ninth year the value of the firm once again falls below the threshold level and stays 
there three consecutive months. According to the consecutive excursion method, the 
distress clock is reset and liquidation procedures are not initiated after three month. 
We receive similar results for the weighted cumulative excursion method, since the 
liquidation state variable has fallen to the value of 0.21 from 0.83 given the fact that 
firm value remained above the threshold for more than five years. In contrast,   19
according to the cumulative excursion method, liquidation is warranted. The distress 
clock is not reset or “moved back” and liquidation is declared immediately after two 
months. The state variable that triggers default has not forgotten or reduced the impact 
of the distress period that occurred in the distant past. Since the sensitivity of the 
trigger in this exaggerates the risk engendered in the current distress episode, one can 
conclude that the consecutive excursion model has a too strong memory. 
5. Numerical Implementation and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We now turn to the implementation of the model for calculating bond prices, equity 
prices and the credit spread of a levered firm. We describe the procedure for model 
implementation, then, comparative statics are presented. 
   
A.  Numerical implementation 
A first step toward numerical solution is discretizing the partial differential equations 
for      and   , I V . Since in most cases, an analytical solution is not available, we need to 
employ a numerical solution. We follow the Monte-Carlo simulation approach since it 
is easy to implement and applicable for a wide range of problems presented in this 
paper. We briefly describe the method, which is discussed extensively in Boyle 
(1977), Broadie and Glasserman (1996) and Boyle et al. (1997).  
Our procedure is as follows: 
A.  We generate independent replications of the firm’s asset value, V , for nshort 
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for  n i ,..., 1 = , where 
) (i Z is a standard normal random variable.  
B. At each time step, we calculate the value of the discrete threshold level as: 
) ( t i T r D
i Pe K
∆ − − = . To replace the discrete monitored threshold level with a 
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 − = π ζ ρ and ζ is the Riemann Zeta function. 
C.  At each time step along the price path, i, we calculate the weighted excursion 
period 
B V
t I by approximating equation (3) and (4), and then check if the CDT 
exceeds the pre- determined grace period, 
K θ . 
D.  Firm value is divided among the various claimants according to equations (9) 
and (10), based on the earliest between the two events T (bond maturity) and 
K θ  (end of the grace period). Each claim payoff is discounted by the risk free 
rate.  
E.  Repeat steps (A)-(C) to collect samples of the bond in a risk- neutral world.  
F.  Calculate the mean of the samples to estimate the value of the various claims. 
 
B.  Application and Analysis 
To demonstrate our approach, we consider some realistic examples and perform a 
sensitivity analysis of the bond price, the equity price and the credit spread with 
respect to a number of parameters. In order to emphasize the impact of our method on   21
the value of the various corporate claims, we also compare our results to existing 
structural methods for modeling credit spreads. 
              As a base case we assume a firm with capital structure which comprising of 
one stock and one zero-coupon bond with  926 . 109 = P  and  5 = T . Firm value comes 
to 100 and, as a result the leverage ratio, (which is defined as  t
rT V Pe LR
− = ), is 
equal to  9 . 0 = LR . The risk free interest rate is  % 4 = r , the pre-determined grace 
period is  25 . 0 = d , the firm asset volatility is  % 30 , and no payout is expected 
) 0 ( = δ . The parameter α  is set to zero, and as a result, the distress severity has no 
influence on the CDT. The parameter γ  equals zero as well, which means that each 
observation on the last distress period has an equal impact on the decision to liquidate 
the firm’s assets. Bondholders hold a contract which enables them takeover the firm at 
the time the value of the firm’s assets is smaller than the discounted balance of debt, 
and as a result, the distress threshold, as in the BC (1976) model, parallels the secured 
discounted balance and equals: 
) ( s T r
t Pe K
− − = . To isolate the impact of the deviations 
from the provisions of the bondholder’s contract on claim value, we assume an 
absence of costs pertaining to liquidation and financial distress.  
                  We  now  analyze  the  determinants  of  the  level  of  credit  spreads  and 
corporate securities values. Table 1 lists the numerical estimates of corporate 
securities within various structural frameworks of default and liquidation. The credit 
spread according to the Merton model comes to 5.1%. This high spread stems from 
the model’s underlying assumption that neither liquidation nor default can occur 
before the contractual maturity of debt, and thus, in instances of financial distress, 
debtholders cannot extract value from the firm prior to maturity. At the other extreme, 
BC (1976) assumes that the firm’s assets are immediately liquidated upon heating the 
distress threshold. If this threshold is equal to the secured discounted debt balance,   22
there is no effective credit risk and the credit spread is equal to zero. Figure 7 and 
table 1 show that as the decay factor of previous distress periods increases, the value 
of debt decreases. At the extreme, as in FM (2002), when  ∞ → β , the distress clock 
is reset whenever the firm’s asset value crosses the distress threshold from below. 
When the grace period is short, and equal to one month, the gap between the credit-
spread according to the total cumulative excursion method  ) 0   , 0 ( = = γ β and  the 
consecutive excursion method  ) 0   , ( = ∞ → γ β is relatively small and equal to 46 basis 
points. However, when the grace period increases to three months, and the violation 
of the terms of the safety covenant are more severe, the gap becomes crucial, reaching 
70 basis points. In this case, modeling the true nature of the liquidation procedure 
becomes more valuable; intermediate values of β may capture the true nature of 
liquidation procedure more appropriately. When the grace period rises to one year, the 
gap between the two extreme cases declines to 67 basis points, since the probability of 
early liquidation by any method is extremely decreased.  
                 Figure 5 and table 2 show that credit spreads increase with asset volatility. 
However, the impact of an increase of beta has a larger effect when volatility is high. 
As reported, when σ=40%, the increase of beta from zero to infinity increases the 
credit spread by 100 basis points, while a similar shift in beta when σ equals 30% 
changes the spread by only 50 basis points. The explanation for this observation is 
fairly straightforward.  As volatility increases, the probability that the firm value will 
fall below the threshold level more frequently increases as well.  Although the total 
cumulative excursion time may approximate that of a less volatile firm, the length of 
each distress period is shortened, and as a result, the impact of past distress periods on 
the liquidation trigger is reduced and the violation of the safety covenant becomes 
more severe.    23
            Figure 6 (and table 6) provides estimated credit spreads for a combination of 
financial leverage ratios  ) (LR and decay factors for previous distress periods (β). As 
beta increases, the gap between the credit-spreads of the two leveraged firms 
increases. When β=0, the credit spreads of the two leveraged firms are equal to 1.84% 
and 1.97%. However, when  ∞ → β , the credit spreads amount to 2.36% and 3.76%. 
The gap between the credit spreads of the two leveraged firms according to Merton 
model comes to 2.87%. This important outcome emphasizes the fact that as the 
liquidation trigger is less sensitive to the impact of past distress periods, an increase in 
financial leverage decreases debtholder protection. 
              Table 3 summarizes the impact of distress severity  (α)  on the securities 
values and credit spreads. Not surprisingly, when the parameter α increases, 
bondholder protection becomes more efficient. When α increases from zero to thirty, 
we observed a sharp decline in the credit spread from 184 and 219 basis points to 111 
and 118 basis points respectively for β values of 0 and 1.5. As α converges to infinity, 
any decrease of the firm’s asset value below the threshold will spark immediate 
liquidation and the result will be a convergence to BC (1976) model.    24
6. Conclusion  
 
We present a simple and general structural model for the valuation of corporate 
securities where the bondholders’ right to force reorganization or liquidation of a 
distressed firm is immediate and may consume time. To evaluate the impact on 
corporation capital structure, we develop a general liquidation model driven by a 
liquidation trigger. Unlike other models, our trigger accommodates a greater number 
of scenarios and enables a more accurate assessment of financial distress. The 
liquidation trigger accumulates over time, but is also dependent on the degree to 
which the threshold is violated. In addition, recent distress episodes can carry a higher 
influence than older episodes. 
                We show that by applying the appropriate liquidation parameters, our model 
converges to François and Morellec (2002) liquidation model, in which liquidation is 
triggered if the value of the firm’s assets has exceeds a consecutive excursion time.  
Moreover, our general model also accommodates Moraux’s (2002) liquidation model, 
which assumes that liquidation occurs if total excursion time exceeds a pre-
determined grace period. While these two models may describe the liquidation 
procedure accurately for a specific bond indenture or for a specific legal regime, our 
model, as illustrated in this paper, covers a wide array of legal precepts and 
contractual arrangements. All of the liquidation models presented above, may be 
viewed as a middle ground approach between the Merton’s framework, where 
liquidation occurs only upon debt maturity and the Black-Cox model, where 
reorganization of the firm’s assets is invoked when a minimum threshold is violated 
during the lifetime of the debt. 
We illustrate the applicability of our model for the valuation of firms with 
simple capital structures and we present both comparative statics and sensitivity   25
analysis of the various corporate claims for various indenture provisions, legal 
regimes and corporate capital structures. 
               A natural direction for future research is to apply the model to environments 
characterized by empirically supported dynamics of risk- free short rates and observed 
credit spreads. Additional features such as interim payments, taxes, liquidation costs, 
debt subordination and alternative bond indentures can be incorporated as well. 
Although not a trivial task, exploring these directions may be rewarding in providing 
new guidance for risk measurement and pricing, as well as for supporting empirical 
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Table 1 
Corporate credit spread and the value of the firm’s capital structure for various 
grace periods and past period decay factors  
 
Scenario  β  Equity value  Debt Value  Credit spread 
0 = β   17.93 82.07  1.84% 
5 . 1 = β   19.31 80.69  2.19% 
3 = β   20.03 79.97  2.36% 
 
Base case 
∞ → β   20.74 79.26  2.54% 
0 = β   14.46 85.54  1.02% 
5 . 1 = β   15.01 84.99  1.14% 
3 = β   15.27 84.73  1.21% 
 
083 . 0 = d  
(One month) 
∞ → β   16.41 83.59  1.48% 
0 = β   24.17 75.83  3.43% 
5 . 1 = β   26.53 73.47  4.06% 
3 = β   26.66 73.34  4.09% 
 
1 = d  
(One year) 
∞ → β   26.67 73.33  4.10% 
T d = (Merton 1974) 
 
30.25 69.75  5.10% 
0 = d  (BC 1976)    10.0 90.0  0.0% 
 
Parameters for the base case are the risk free interest rate  % 4 = r , the volatility of the firm’s assets 
volatility  % 30 = σ ,  926 . 109 = P  and  5 = T . The firm asset value equals 100, and as a result, the 
leverage ratio, which is defined as  t
rT V Fe LR
− = , equals  9 . 0 = LR . The pre- determined grace period: 
25 . 0 = d , no payout is delivered  ) 0 ( = δ . The liquidation model parameters  γ α   and    are set at zero. 
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Table 2 
Corporate credit spread and the value of the firm’s capital structure for various 
asset volatilities, leverage value and past period decay factor. 
 
Scenario  β  Equity value  Debt Value  Credit spread 
0 = β   17.93 82.07 1.84% 
5 . 1 = β   19.31 80.69 2.19% 
3 = β   20.03 79.97 2.36% 
 
Base case 
∞ → β   20.74 79.26 2.54% 
T d = (Merton 1974)    30.25 69.75 5.10% 
0 = d  (BC 1976)    10.0 90.0 0.0% 
0 = β   21.02 78.98 2.61% 
5 . 1 = β   22.90 77.10 3.09% 
3 = β   23.89 76.11 3.35% 
 
% 40 = σ  
 
∞ → β   24.82 75.18 3.60% 
T d = (Merton 1974)    36.21 63.78 7.97% 
0 = β   13.93 86.07 1.97% 
5 . 1 = β   15.46 84.54 2.33% 
3 = β   16.27 83.73 2.53% 
 
95 . 0 = LR  
) 03 . 116 ( = P  
∞ → β   21.28 78.72 3.76% 
T d = (Merton1974)    28.18 71.82 5.60% 
0 = d (BC 1976)    5.00 95.00 0.00% 
 
 
Parameters for the base case are similar to those of table 1. 
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Table 3 
Corporate credit spread and the value of the firm’s capital structure for various 
liquidation model parameters  
 
Scenario  β  Equity value  Debt Value  Credit spread 
0 = β   17.93 82.07 1.84% 
5 . 1 = β   19.31 80.69 2.19% 
3 = β   20.03 79.97 2.36% 
 
Base case 
∞ → β   20.74 79.26 2.54% 
0 = β   17.42 82.58 1.72% 
5 . 1 = β   18.54 81.46 1.99% 
3 = β   19.09 80.91 2.13% 
 
 
3 = α  
 
∞ → β   19.77 80.23 2.30% 
  0 = β   14.85 85.15 1.11% 
        30 = α   5 . 1 = β   15.17 84.83 1.18% 
  3 = β   15.30 84.70 1.21% 
  ∞ → β   15.69 84.31 1.31% 
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Figure 1 
Example 1: Simulation of the firm’s asset value and the distress threshold. 
 
 In Figure 1 we simulate one path of the distress threshold and firm value over a ten- year period, as 
discussed in example 1 in chapter 4. The distress threshold is worth 
rt
t Pe K
− = , where  04 . 0 = r and 
100 = P . 
 
Figure 2 
Example 1: Simulation of excursion time according to alternative trigger models. 
 
In figure 2 the weighted excursion period is calculated for the firm’s path value presented in figure 1. 
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Figure 3 
Example 2: Simulation of firm value and the distress threshold. 
 
 
In Figure 3 we simulate one path of the distress threshold and the firm’s asset value over a ten- year 
period, as discussed in example 2 in chapter 4. The distress threshold is 
rt
t Pe K
− = , where 
04 . 0 = r and  100 = P . 
 
Figure 4 
Example 2: Simulation of excursion time according to alternative trigger models. 
 
In figure 4, the weighted excursion period is calculated for the firm’s path value presented in figure 1. 
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Figure 5 
Corporate credit spread as a function of past distress decay factor (β)  β)  β)  β) and       asset 
volatility (σ σ σ σ).  
 
Parameters: See table 1. 
 
Figure 6 
Corporate credit spread as a function of past distress decay factor (β)  β)  β)  β) and 
leverage ratio (LR).  
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Figure 7 
Corporate credit spread as a function of past distress decay factor (β)  β)  β)  β) and grace 
period (d).  
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